Synthesis

Looking back on CMJR 494, I’ve found that my thoughts on freedom of speech have drastically changed from my initial thoughts when walking into the class on the first Wednesday night a couple of months ago. This change is clear in my blog posts, where my stance has changed bi-weekly depending on any given issue.

For example, I wrote my first blog post on the Ecco Homo exhibition and the Jyllands-Posten cartoons. In this case study, I was adamant that the rights of Kurt Westergaard (cartoonist) and the Ecco Homo exhibition be given utmost protection under John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. The last quote of my post stated that “Although it is important to respect majority group values, sometimes it is necessary to push the boundaries in order to contribute to debate that can lead to social change.” Two weeks later, I completely contradicted this assertion.

The next blog post I wrote was about the Westboro Baptist Church, and the hateful speech that they spread via offensive signs and protects at the funerals of fallen soldiers. In this case, I dropped Mill’s harm principle and instead used Zechariah Chafee to support my argument that the WBC should be punished, and that their speech rights should not be protected. The WBC’s speech is pushing boundaries and fueling the debate that may possibly lead to social change, but this speech was so offensive to me that I unknowingly attempted to protect similar speech without supporting the WBC.

Next, I took a look at obscenity and the regulation of consenting adults voluntarily sharing sexual materials. In this case, I looked to protect this type of sexual speech in a very circumstantial way. I wanted to protect the speech, but only if it didn’t get into the wrong hands. If I had applied a speaker in this case, I likely would have applied Mill’s harm principle.

Finally, I wrote on animal cruelty and animal rights, a topic that I had a considerable amount of difficulty with. As a pronounced animal lover who could barely watch the CNN video clip about crush videos, I had a tough time considering protecting the rights of someone who was hurting an animal. However, upon further investigation I found that prohibiting certain speech regarding animals would lead serious censorship of speech later on, precedents that I didn’t want to have put in place. I ended up using Chafee’s philosophy (again), and used Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire to divide depiction of animal cruelty into categories of worthless and valuable. By applying a SLAPS clause, I attempted to make this distinction.

Until I began to write this final post, I thought that I was definitely a follower of Mill’s broad philosophy of complete protection of speech, unless it will cause harm to others. However, it seems that I am actually a Chafee supporter, as I have begun to support all of my arguments with Chafee’s beliefs of protecting any speech that promotes social interest, while often individual speech is worthless if it is lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, or insulting. It seems that I don’t mind insulting or lewd speech, but once speech becomes too obscene or profane for my liking, I immediately turn to Chafee.

As for my go-to theory, I think I’d have to go with the offense theory, as I feel that sometimes the harm principle doesn’t go as far as I would like. Joel Feinberg's offense principle fit the bill for a lot of the situations and cases that I examined. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy sums up Feinberg’s argument nicely:

"In some instances, Feinberg suggests, we also need an offense principle that can act as a guide to public censure. The basic idea is that the harm principle sets the bar too high and that we can legitimately prohibit some forms of expression because they are very offensive. Offending someone is less serious than harming someone, so the penalties imposed should be less severe than those for causing harm."

I’m surprised by how far I’ve strayed from Mill here at the end of the quarter. I have definitely redefined my understanding of free speech, and begun to draw a line between protected and unprotected speech. I think that my current opinion is that all speech should receive protection until it becomes individual speech that harms or overly offends another individual or a group. I think that offensive speech is fine until causes permanent harm that could be prevented by prohibiting the speech (Westboro protests), or if it sets a bad example for acceptable behavior (such as animal cruelty).

Cases that I’ve found myself using to support my arguments are mainly Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, a landmark case that defined worthless speech, and Miller v. California, which defined obscenity and added the idea of a SLAPS clause, something that I’ve become fond of adding to many of my arguments. I appreciate Miller v. California due to the idea of looking at a work as a whole before prohibiting it, and the concept of SLAPS (serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific) value. In Chaplinsky, a unanimous court decision deemed “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” as speech that shouldn’t protected. This fits with Chafee’s philosophy about social interest versus individual interest.

Clearly, I am trying to find a definition that supports my previous blog posts to an extent, and to be honest, I don’t know if that opinion will remain the same. Even in writing this post, I am beginning to question where I stand on the freedom of speech, this fluid concept that everyone believes to be their unconditional right, yet under scrutiny there are so many rules, loopholes, and red tape. That’s the beauty of the freedom of speech, it seems so obvious, so simple, but in fact it’s a complex concept that’s constantly evolving.