Synthesis

Looking back on CMJR 494, I’ve found that my thoughts on freedom of speech have drastically changed from my initial thoughts when walking into the class on the first Wednesday night a couple of months ago. This change is clear in my blog posts, where my stance has changed bi-weekly depending on any given issue.

For example, I wrote my first blog post on the Ecco Homo exhibition and the Jyllands-Posten cartoons. In this case study, I was adamant that the rights of Kurt Westergaard (cartoonist) and the Ecco Homo exhibition be given utmost protection under John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. The last quote of my post stated that “Although it is important to respect majority group values, sometimes it is necessary to push the boundaries in order to contribute to debate that can lead to social change.” Two weeks later, I completely contradicted this assertion.

The next blog post I wrote was about the Westboro Baptist Church, and the hateful speech that they spread via offensive signs and protects at the funerals of fallen soldiers. In this case, I dropped Mill’s harm principle and instead used Zechariah Chafee to support my argument that the WBC should be punished, and that their speech rights should not be protected. The WBC’s speech is pushing boundaries and fueling the debate that may possibly lead to social change, but this speech was so offensive to me that I unknowingly attempted to protect similar speech without supporting the WBC.

Next, I took a look at obscenity and the regulation of consenting adults voluntarily sharing sexual materials. In this case, I looked to protect this type of sexual speech in a very circumstantial way. I wanted to protect the speech, but only if it didn’t get into the wrong hands. If I had applied a speaker in this case, I likely would have applied Mill’s harm principle.

Finally, I wrote on animal cruelty and animal rights, a topic that I had a considerable amount of difficulty with. As a pronounced animal lover who could barely watch the CNN video clip about crush videos, I had a tough time considering protecting the rights of someone who was hurting an animal. However, upon further investigation I found that prohibiting certain speech regarding animals would lead serious censorship of speech later on, precedents that I didn’t want to have put in place. I ended up using Chafee’s philosophy (again), and used Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire to divide depiction of animal cruelty into categories of worthless and valuable. By applying a SLAPS clause, I attempted to make this distinction.

Until I began to write this final post, I thought that I was definitely a follower of Mill’s broad philosophy of complete protection of speech, unless it will cause harm to others. However, it seems that I am actually a Chafee supporter, as I have begun to support all of my arguments with Chafee’s beliefs of protecting any speech that promotes social interest, while often individual speech is worthless if it is lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, or insulting. It seems that I don’t mind insulting or lewd speech, but once speech becomes too obscene or profane for my liking, I immediately turn to Chafee.

As for my go-to theory, I think I’d have to go with the offense theory, as I feel that sometimes the harm principle doesn’t go as far as I would like. Joel Feinberg's offense principle fit the bill for a lot of the situations and cases that I examined. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy sums up Feinberg’s argument nicely:

"In some instances, Feinberg suggests, we also need an offense principle that can act as a guide to public censure. The basic idea is that the harm principle sets the bar too high and that we can legitimately prohibit some forms of expression because they are very offensive. Offending someone is less serious than harming someone, so the penalties imposed should be less severe than those for causing harm."

I’m surprised by how far I’ve strayed from Mill here at the end of the quarter. I have definitely redefined my understanding of free speech, and begun to draw a line between protected and unprotected speech. I think that my current opinion is that all speech should receive protection until it becomes individual speech that harms or overly offends another individual or a group. I think that offensive speech is fine until causes permanent harm that could be prevented by prohibiting the speech (Westboro protests), or if it sets a bad example for acceptable behavior (such as animal cruelty).

Cases that I’ve found myself using to support my arguments are mainly Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, a landmark case that defined worthless speech, and Miller v. California, which defined obscenity and added the idea of a SLAPS clause, something that I’ve become fond of adding to many of my arguments. I appreciate Miller v. California due to the idea of looking at a work as a whole before prohibiting it, and the concept of SLAPS (serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific) value. In Chaplinsky, a unanimous court decision deemed “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” as speech that shouldn’t protected. This fits with Chafee’s philosophy about social interest versus individual interest.

Clearly, I am trying to find a definition that supports my previous blog posts to an extent, and to be honest, I don’t know if that opinion will remain the same. Even in writing this post, I am beginning to question where I stand on the freedom of speech, this fluid concept that everyone believes to be their unconditional right, yet under scrutiny there are so many rules, loopholes, and red tape. That’s the beauty of the freedom of speech, it seems so obvious, so simple, but in fact it’s a complex concept that’s constantly evolving.

Simultaneously protecting free speech and animal rights?

In United States v. Stevens, Robert J. Stevens was convicted of making three videotapes that depicted dog-fighting, and dogs being trained for fighting. The tapes were labeled as depictions of animal cruelty, and Steven’s was sentenced to 37 months in prison for violating the exception to the First Amendment’s speech clause that criminalizes videotapes and other depictions of animal cruelty.

Before U.S v. Stevens, the only unprotected speech under the First Amendment was fighting words, obscenity, incitement, libel, and child pornography. The result of U.S v. Stevens could add another item to this list. The law in question that might possibly be passed under U.S v. Stevens stemmed from crush videos which were outlawed in 1999 with a statute making it a crime to create, sell, or possess depictions of animal cruelty, if the cruelty is illegal by United States law. Crush videos are portrayals of women in high heels or sometimes even bare feet, crushing vulnerable animals ranging from insects to kittens. These videos apparently appeal to about 1,000 fetishists worldwide, and aren’t widely distributed, likely because a)they are now illegal, and b)most people find them absolutely revolting. At any rate, U.S. v. Stevens attempted to overturn the 1999 response to crush videos in order to protect Steven’s free speech rights due to the three dog-fighting videos.

The real question here (in my opinion) lies in the difference between depiction of animal cruelty, and the cruelty itself. If a dog fight tales places in a country where it is legal, this isn’t a problem. If it is taped in the country where it is legal, everything’s still okay. However, once that depiction is brought to the United States, where depictions of animal cruelty are banned, the depiction is deemed illegal even though it didn’t take place on American soil. This leads to the next question of the definition of animal cruelty, and what it consists of. Animals, it is assumed, don’t feel shame, and therefore won’t experience negative repercussions upon the release of videos of them. This differs from child porn, where shame plays a huge part in legislation meant to protect children and ban child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 48 describes the current laws regarding depictions of animal cruelty.

18 U.S.C. § 48 defines animal cruelty as:

“any visual or auditory depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place in the State.”

When analyzing U.S. Stevens, I lean towards protecting his speech, only because of the consequences that may arise if his speech was prohibited. The videos that he narrated and distributed contain some material that is decades old, and this leads to the historical and cultural implications that could result from banning such videos. Should SLAPS apply, or should historical, artistic, or cultural depictions of “animal cruelty” be banned? Possible examples are: Videos of Eskimos whaling, an activity that’s been tradition in their culture for centuries, or a scene from the award-winning film Apocalypse Now where a live water buffalo is hacked to death with a machete. If Stevens’ speech wasn’t protected, it would mean that depictions such as those defined could also be prosecuted.

To protect Stevens’ speech, I would use Zechariah Chafee’s philosophy concerning free speech. Chafee believes in protecting speech that serves social interest, however he doesn’t protect “worthless” speech, which he specifically describes as profane, indecent, or defamatory. I choose Chafee’s philosophy because under a SLAPS clause, some material of what could possibly be labeled as animal cruelty (movie scenes, historical documentaries, images depicting a cultural traditions i.e. bullfighting) would be protected because it serves social interest by educating society. Chafee might argue that videos of dog-fighting serve social interest because they are depictions of a long-standing cultural activity that takes place in many countries worldwide.

Although I think that some depictions of animal cruelty (those which serve a greater purpose) should be protected, I think that these depictions should not harm animals. Meaning that although dog-fighting, or cock-fighting, or whaling, could be depicted, it couldn’t be a real-life depiction of the action taking place but instead a simulation. However, I would protect previous depictions of real-life depictions under a SLAPS clause (on a case-by-case basis) due to their historical value, unless they were particularly offensive i.e.crush videos.

In the case of animal cruelty and in order to support my stance on depictions, I found that it was hard to use provisions under New York v. Ferber due to the sexual aspect of the speech. When it comes to animals and sex, I don’t think that any speech should be protected, and therefore the government has a “compelling interest” to protect the sexual exploitation of animals, which I believe are as vulnerable as children regardless of their ability to feel shame. The actions, which are already illegal, should remain that way, and I feel that depictions of these actions can serve as encouragement to turn fantasy into reality in a very disturbing way.

However, Stevens speech clearly doesn’t have a sexual element to it, and therefore doesn’t fall under the same requirements as child porn. Since I want to protect Stevens’ speech, I would use Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, a landmark case that deals with worthless speech. In order to separate animal depictions that I deem acceptable from those that should be depicted, I would divide them into categories of worthless and not worthless speech. Depictions that fall under the SLAPS clause would not be worthless speech, but those that actually cause harm to animals would be worthless.

Overall, I would protect Steven’s speech due to the repercussions of prohibiting his videos. However, I would try to implement my stance on the depictions of actual animal cruelty versus depictions that don’t actually harm animals in order to bring the public images of cultural traditions without actually harming animals, while allowing the historical depictions to still exist and be watched without repercussions.

Applying obscenity standards and Reno v. ACLU to online sexual speech

Address the three questions at the top of this discussion with reference to the topic of sexually-oriented ADULT-to-ADULT web camming and the voluntary self-postings of homemade sex videos on various sites. To what extent would you support a federal law that regulated such sexual materials by banning them and/or punishing Internet Service Providers who allow such transmissions or postings? Would you punish the material as “indecent” under FCC v. Pacifica, overruling the Supreme Court decision in Reno v. ACLU or would you apply obscenity standards?

1) Should words, images and sounds that stimulate erotic or sexual thoughts be granted the same protection as political speech?
Words, images, and sounds that stimulate erotic thoughts should be granted a high level of protection, and they should be given the same absolute protection as political speech, except only in certain online and offline forums. In these places the sexual speech should be protected to the utmost degree, but otherwise it should be susceptible to punishment.

Although often controversial, and not always accepted by all, I believe that it is important for this kind of speech to be protected to a high extent. It should be protected until it becomes obscene, as obscenity is still criminal in all media. The overall definition of obscenity that I want to use to support my argument was applied to Miller v. California, where it was decided that obscenity was not protected under the First Amendment, and that the Miller Test should be used when decided if speech was obscene or not. A work was defined as obscene if an average person applying community standards finds:

• The work as a whole whole appeals to prurient interest, and;
• It depicts in a patently offensive way sexual conduct outlawed by specific state law, and;
• It lacks Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or Scientific value as judged by national standard.

However I feel that only parts of this definition should be used to punish sexual speech. I don’t think that a work needs to have SLAPS in order to be protected. I highly doubt that many of the sexual materials available on the internet have artistic value beyond bringing pleasure to the viewer. I also don’t think that it matters if a work appeals to a prurient interest or not. Other kinds of highly offensive speech are protected by law, and I don’t think that sexual speech should be treated any differently. I do think that if the work is portraying something prohibited by specific state law, it shouldn’t be protected speech, especially if it is being posted on the world wide web for everyone to see. I am still struggling with the concept of that material being acceptable if kept within the confines of a person’s home as was protected under Stanley v. Georgia. This 1969 decision protects the possession of obscene speech, but allows punishment for creation and distribution of the same kind of speech. I agree with the court decision in this case, and see no problem with watching obscene material in the privacy of one's home. As long as the sexual speech is not prohibited by law (ex. child pornography, beastiality), it should be protected. Furthermore, this material should be allowed to be produced and shared (under certain conditions) as long as it doesn't violate state laws, in my opinion.

2) Should adults have the same rights to create such speech for private use, distribute such speech for public consumption and receive such speech – or should varying levels of protection be applied?
In accordance with Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, I think that adults have the right to post and participate in sexual speech via the internet, and that this speech should be protected. The 1997 case marked nine Justices of the Court striking down anti-indecency provisions of the Communication Decency Act because these provisions suppressed free speech rights of internet users. The provisions were meant to protect children from encountering sexual material online by criminalizing any obscene messages sent to minor recipients, and also criminalizing the knowing sending of any material that basically depicted and/or described sexual activities or organs. The majority opinion was that less restrictive measures could be used to protect children while maintaining free speech among adults on the internet.

Under Reno v. ACLU, adults should be able to create, distribute, and receive such speech (posting of homemade sexual material/webcamming) on the internet. Varying levels shouldn’t be applied for the different actions – I think they should all be protected unless deemed obscene and being transmitted to a captive audience or children (Justice Brennan’s approach to sexual speech).

3) Should the same levels of protection apply to ALL media – print, broadcast, movies, cable, online sites, webcams/chat – or should the levels of protection vary according to medium?
Adult-to-adult materials such as webcams/chat and online sites are easier to contain on the internet that all types on media. I think that the sexual speech should not be protected to a high degree if being broadcast via television, radio, or cable. These are portals that are widely watched, and an audience that doesn't want to see sexual material could more easily stumble across it if it was broadcast all over the place. I think that for the safety of children, sexual speech should be contained in closed portals that are not as accessible, and that take more effort to experience.

Movies are more of a choice because they are often kept in a certain section of a DVD or video rental store. It requires more effort to buy a video and take it home than to turn on the television to a regular station and all of a sudden be watching some aspect of sexual speech. They should therefore be protected under Burstyn v. Wilson, a case that decided that movies do have value and are protected speech under the First Amendment and marked the decline of movie censorship in the United States. I feel that the internet is the same way -- a viewer or participant needs to make an effort to reach sexual speech in most cases. They need to go on the computer, find a certain kind of website, pass a warning page, and often log in before they can access sexual material. Material found in these areas of the web should receive protection. However, this argument could be partially undermined by the widespread use of webcams. Now, anyone anywhere can connect a camera to their computer and go online to any kind of chatroom to get involved in sexual speech. I don't think this should be protected unless it is on certain websites and online spaces where people have to knowingly make the decision to engage in such speech.

Offensive Speech: Westboro Baptist Church

The Westboro Baptist Church is a controversial church known for its infamous protests at the funerals of fallen soldiers and for their outspoken opinions about homosexuals, among other minority groups. Although they do not place physical harm upon others, they verbalize their strong opinions through signs, their online presence, and defamation of the American people, who they claim are doomed to hell (unless, of course, they are a member of the Westboro church). The WBC is lead by Fred Phelps, who founded the organization in 1955.

The WBC has been taken to court several times for their offensive protests. For instance, a 2006 law was passed that makes it a felony to protest within 500 feet of a funeral in response to the WBC pickets. Additionally, the WBC was sued by a dead soldier’s family in 2006 because they picketed his funeral. The court ruled in the WBC’s favor, stating that they were exercising free speech rights that are protected by law. In recent news, the group was featured in the 2009 film Bruno, and was counter-protested when they picketed outside of the Twitter headquarters last week.

Often defined as a hate group, the WBC claims that they are spreading God’s word, and they are doing a good deed by warning people that they will go to hell if they continue their “sinful” ways. The WBC spreads their message with extremely offensive signs, using language that is lewd and insulting. According to Zechariah Chafee, a philosopher who supports free speech that supports self-governance and democracy, this speech would be “worthless speech”. It does not promote social interest, and additionally, it can be argued that the speech is in the individual interest of the WBC. They are a group that continually offends society, and they refuse to understand the interests of other people or groups who are unlike them.

Although I like Chafee’s supposed outlook on the WBC, there are other philosophers who would support the WBC’s speech, for example, John Stuart Mill. Mill would ask if the WBC is harming anyone, and if so, is the harm legitimate or illegitimate. Mill states in his harm principle that the only purpose of prohibiting free speech against someone’s will is to “prevent harm to others.” Harm is an action that invades the rights of another person. Although the WBC is not inflicting physical harm on anyone, they are causing emotional distress that I believe has the potential to be harmful. They are insulting both major and minority groups by continually attacking their beliefs and values.

It seems as if the WBC is not violating Mill’s harm principle to a legitimate degree, but they are definitely violating both the offense theory and the respect theory. Joel Feinberg’s offense theory is based on the idea that the harm principle sets the bar too high, and some forms of highly offensive expression should still be prohibited even if they don’t violate the harm principle. Due to it’s “worthless” (lewd, obscene, slanderous, fighting words) nature, the WBC should not be allowed to continue their behavior under the offense principle. According to the offense principle and its relation to hate speech, Feinberg would say that the WBC’s hateful messages are no longer avoidable by the general public, and currently offend a large number of people. He would however, allow them to meet in private, and they could exercise their free speech there. The WBC is also violating the citizen-respect theory, because they are offending not only individuals but also groups, in particular, marginalized groups such as homosexuals and Jews.

I personally feel that under the offense and respect principle, the WBC should be banned from picketing and parading their offensive signs. I think that their outright displays of hatred are going beyond their right to free speech because they are no longer avoidable by the general public and they are targeting specific groups. I don’t think that the WBC should be banned entirely. They should be allowed to practice their beliefs in private, such as in their church, and maintain their website, since the public can choose whether or not they want to visit it.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is one case that supports my argument. In this case, a Jehovah’s Witness was using a private sidewalk as a pulpit, causing a scene. Additionally, he verbally attacked a marshal, which led to his arrest in accordance with a New Hampshire law that prohibits directed offensive speech. The unanimous court decision in this case was that there are limited categories of speech which are not protected by the First Amendment. As stated by Justice Frank Murphy,“These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” The WBC’s messages do breach peace due to their offensive nature, and they do more harm than good to society.

Although it can be argued that under Cohen v. California, the WBC would be able to continue spreading their messages, I wonder if this is accurate. The court ruling in the case states that "the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense." The WBC publicly displays their messages every chance that they get – it’s not an occasional action. The publicity of the WBC is more widespread than the famous “Fuck the Draft” jacket worn by Paul Cohen. And the four-letter word used on the jacket is only one of the many offensive words used by the WBC, not to mention their racial, anti-religion, and homophobic slurs. I agree that vulgarity is a necessary evil and that it is a side-effect in the exchange of ideas, but is the vulgarity employed by the WBC too over-the-top to accept given the WBC’s unappealing and offensive messages and ideas? Especially considering that few people share the WBC's beliefs except the people who are members of the church itself.

In conclusion, I feel that the WBC should be judged in accordance with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, and their free speech should be punished due to its violation of the offense and respect theories, and possibly the harm theory as well (depending on the definition given of “harm”). I support my stance with Chafee’s philosophy of democratic speech that promotes social interest, and I think that the WBC should be able to practice their free speech out of public view in accordance with Joel Feinberg's views on the offense principle and hate speech. I would not provide the WBC with absolute protection of free speech, because I think that their speech should be prohibited due it its high level of offensiveness to society. Therefore, I would use minimal scrutiny, in which the government must provide only a rational reason for their regulation and restriction of the WBC’s speech. If Mill’s harm principle proved to be applicable, I might instead look at the case under the lens of intermediate scrutiny, if it passed the test of clear and present danger. However, it doesn’t seem as though the WBC is causing any immediate or obvious risks, unless emotional harm and distress can be defined as dangerous and harmful.

Controversial Images: Ecco Homo Exhibition and Jyllands-Posten Cartoons

I believe that laws that govern communication should primarily protect an individual civil liberty, even if an individual makes an assertion that defies group values and norms. Some reasons for this belief are:

1. Reinforcing group ideals that aren’t necessary good. How can a group move forward and evolve positively if new ideas and information aren’t accepted from individual members?
2. Communication is an exchange of information, and information must be both sent AND received in order to lead to successful communication. Limiting a person’s freedom of speech means that information that fits group values is being sent and received, but the receiver may be unable to send out information that communicates their personal values and beliefs.
3. By limiting freedom of speech to individuals, basic rights are being suppressed in order to maintain a group’s needs. This means that individual needs may not be being met.

After learning about some of John Stuart Mill’s philosophy, I think that his beliefs on freedom of speech can be applied to the cases of Ecco Homo and Jyllands-Posten. Mill argues that “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”, meaning that no matter how immoral a person’s speech, they should be allowed to speak their opinions. Mill argues that everyone should be given the freedom of speech, and that every doctrine should be allowed to be professed and discussed. In regards to the harm principle, Mill does believe that one guideline should be used.

The harm principle is that power can be exercised against freedom of speech against one’s will if it will prevent harm to others. This can be applied to the Jyllands-Posten controversy because after the publication of the cartoons, riots took place, and as a result 100 people died. Additionally, the cartoonist was also put in harms way when he was attacked in his home by someone angered by the images. I don’t think that the harm principle should be applied however, because the deaths and the attack took place after the release of the cartoons. In an interview with Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist, he stated that he had no idea of the reaction that people would have to his images. Because he wasn’t trying to cause harm AND because the harm was a repercussion of the speech but not the speech itself, I don’t feel that the harm principle can be applied here.

Mill’s point about how every doctrine should be free to be professed and discussed is applicable to the two cases because both of them created space for discussion. This discussion, although offensive to some, sparks ideas and opinions about important issues, such as biblical traditions and understanding of Muhammad and the Islam faith. In order to further society, discussions need to take place that push limits and get citizens thinking about the world around them. If a majority group is in charge of free speech, it is difficult for individual opinions that are beneficial to discussion and change, to take place.

Because of my belief that individual speech rights should be protected, I would support the Ecco Homo exhibition, and the Jyllands-Posten satirization of Muhammed. Both cases are excellent examples of the importance of the freedom of speech. The Ecco Homo exhibition is a collection of 12 images that take biblical surrounding and update the context. Homosexuals, people with AIDs and transgenders take the place of lepers and tax-payers as people who are often go unwelcomed in society. The exhibition pushes the viewer to look beyond traditional images, and modernize them to fit the world today. Although the images may be disturbing to some, they are an important reminder that everyone interprets the bible and biblical images in a different way, and by accepting these interpretations, we can further our understanding of them. Mill’s philosophy can be incorporated into the freedom of speech issues that surrounded the controversy, because liberty of expression is used to push arguments past their comfortable limits.

In the case of the Jyllands-Posten satirization, freedom of speech should still be applied. 12 cartoons were released in 2005 in a Danish newspaper, all of which depicted the Islam prophet Muhammad. The cartoons were meant to respond to debate concerning criticism of Islam. The cartoons were released at a fitting time, because after the 9/11 attacks, fear began surrounding Islam faith and misunderstandings arose about terrorism, Islam and Muhammad. The cartoons led to giant riots around the Muslim world, and resulted in about 100 deaths. Supporters of the cartoons praised them for contributing to the issues around self-censorship, and pointed out that Muslims weren’t being targeted because other religions are also ridiculed in cartoons. Critics viewed the cartoons as racist, and said that the cartoons were both humiliating and blasphemous for the Muslim community.

Although there was outrage from the cartoons, the newspaper and the cartoonist had the freedom of speech to create them, and I think that this freedom of speech should be protected, even though majority groups were offended by the images. I believe that in order to increase awareness and understanding of an issue, all areas of the issue must be assessed. In the case of the cartoons, they raised awareness about Muslims and Muslim faith, even though the connotations of the cartoons can be viewed as negative. The cartoons led to discussion that may not have taken place otherwise, and are therefore valuable to furthering social change and public understanding. Furthermore, they are important in terms of self-censorship. Publishing the cartoons and taking responsibility for them was a strong action, one which was necessary in order to remind us of the value of self-censorship and free speech.

In conclusion, Mill’s philosophy about free speech is applicable to the Ecco Homo exhibition and the Jyllands-Posten cartoon. Without controversy, there would be no discussion, and society wouldn’t be able to move forward. It is important to protect the individuals who were involved in both cases, and to respect their right to freedom of speech, even though both cases were viewed as immoral by some critics. Although it is important to respect majority group values, sometimes it is necessary to push the boundaries in order to contribute to debate that can lead to social change.